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KENTucKy LAW JouNAL[
matter of realistic ethics. It is well established that an accused is
entitled to representation regardless of the offense.2 5 This right is not
superficial, but one of substance.2 6 If such a right exists for the accused,
a duty falls upon the attorney appointed by the court to represent the
accused in a capable manner. In the past, decisions have been reversed
where either the trial court or the court-appointed counsel was
delinquent in executing its duties.2r Such action tends to indicate that
the Supreme Court of the United States and the highest courts in the
several states are concerned with adequate representation of the
indigent accused. This process without compensation may, however,
be economically burdensome, at times so great as to endanger the
lawyer's career.
28
A comprehensive program which would afford adequate repre-
sentation in criminal actions is overdue in this state. We must be
realistic in our appraisal of the legal profession. While it may be that
every member of the bar proclaims his readiness to serve as counsel
for indigents, the courts, for various reasons, tend to appoint recent
graduates. Such experience is good for the young attorney, but it does
not always give the best protection to the accused. In relation to the
magnitude of the problem of representing indigents in criminal pro-
ceedings, few law students are inclined to enter the area of criminal
law when a livelihood is not available in such a practice. Thus, we
find ourselves in a vicious circle; recent graduates with little interest in
criminal law are appointed to represent the indigents; due to their
superficial interest, the defense is inadequate. In some moral sense, this
situation may be deplorable, but in reality it exists and will con-
tinue until action is taken either by the Court or the Legislature to
provide stimulus for lawyers to take a personal interest in representing
the indigent accused.
David Emerson
CluMINAL LAW - HoMIcmE - Mtru- MANsrAuGEm-R- BzrmAL FoR
MAsNAUGHTEm ON EvmENcE OF MuanEH.-At the first trial for murder
of his wife, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The
evidence, while possibly supporting defendant's theory of suicide, did
not show any mitigating circumstances which would have allowed a
2 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 Johnson v. United States, 110 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
2 7 Curry v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1965); Rayon v. State,
267 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1954).
28 Comment, 16 HASTNGS L.J. 274 (1964).
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reduction to voluntary manslaughter. The jury was instructed to
decide whether there had been a homicide, and if so, whether defend-
ant was responsible. Because the instructions were ambiguous, a re-
versal and new trial were granted. At the second trial, on an indictment
of voluntary manslaughter, the commonwealth presented the same
evidence. The defendant then demurred, claiming that such evidence
would not support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, since the
element of mitigating circumstances was not shown. The trial court
sustained the demurrer, which was appealed. Held: Reversed. For the
protection of society from dangerous criminals, a defendant convicted
of voluntary manslaughter on a murder indictment by evidence indi-
cating murder without provocation may on retrial be acquitted only
by the jury, and not released on demurrer. Commonwealth v. Frazier,
420 Pa. 209, 216 A.2d 337 (1966).
The criminal procedure established by this decision allowed the
commonwealth to ask for a verdict of voluntary manslaughter without
proving the elements of such a crime. This was possible because the
jury in the first trial had the power under Pennsylvania common law
to convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter on a murder indict-
ment, though the evidence was insufficient to show provocation, since
the lesser crime is part of the greater.1 Pennsylvania precedent had al-
ready established that "in such cases the jury is not bound to accept
the version of either the commonwealth or that of the defense, but
must determine from the evidence what the true situation was at the
time of the homicide."2 However, Commonwealth v. Kellyon had held
that, although instructed that there is no evidence of mitigating
Piroumstances, a jury still has the power to return voluntary man-
slau~hter.3 And on defendant's appeal from conviction of the lesser
crime, though there was no instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the
court continued to follow these principles:
[Wlhile in view of the evidence, the verdict of voluntary manslaughter
is difficult to understand, such a verdict is strictly within the jury's pre-
rogative, and may be returned even in the absence of evidence of suf-
ficient provocation and passion if the evidence as a whole is sufficient
to warrant defendant's conviction of murder.4
The court again recognized this jury power in a case subsequent to
the second Frazier case, but said that where there was no proof of
killing under the influence of passion or provocation, then it is not
1 Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Nelson, 396 Pa. 359, 152 A.2d 913 (1959); Commonwealth v. Steele,
362 Pa. 427, 66 A.2d 825 (1949).
2 Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427, 66 A.2d 825 (1949).
3278 Pa. 59, 122 Afd. 166 (1923).
4 420 Pa. 209, 216 A.2d at 337.
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error to fail to give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.5 Col-
lateral to the jury's power to convict of a lesser crime is the principle
that such a conviction implicitly acquitted defendant of the greater
crime of murder.6 This prevented defendant from twice being in
jeopardy for the same offense.7 There was, then, no issue of double
jeopardy since defendant was retried for manslaughter, not murder.
The commonwealth, limited in the second trial to voluntary man-
slaughter, was forced to prove that charge without evidence of pro-
vocation, or else release the defendant.8 However, the court reasoned
that a reversal because of erroneous instructions should not permit
defendant to be released on demurrer. The court said public policy
demanded that a technicality not defeat "the underlying and basic
principle of criminal law, i.e., the protection of society. . ." from "this
man whom the commonwealth's evidence shows is a dangerous crimi-
nal."9 And, further, "the law is not and should not be so foolish as to
unqualifiedly release and free without acquittal by a jury, a person
indicted for homicidal manslaughter whom the evidence proved was
guilty of murder."10 Thus the present Frazier decision adopts the rule
of other jurisdictions that on retrial, where prosecution for the greater
offense is barred by past acquittal, the defendant may and should be
convicted of the lesser offense, even if the evidence justifies only a
conviction of the higher."
Such a principle of law is a definite exception to established crim-
5 Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 220 A.2d 807 (1966). The court
said this was consistent with the second Frazier case, but the dissent argued that
unless an instruction for voluntary manslaughter was always given the jury would
not know it had that power.
6 Where defendant requests correction of error in the first trial, he waives his
constitutional protection against double jeopardy, but such waiver "goes no
further than the accused himself extends"; he asks only a "correction of so much
of the judgment as convicted him of guilt." Commonwealth v. Dietrick, 221 Pa.
7, 70 At. 275, 279 (1908). See also Green v. United States, 855 U.S. 184 (1957);
Commonwealth v. Flax, 831 Pa. 145, 200 Ad. 632 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Gabor, 209 Pa. 201, 58 AUt. 278 (1904). Fifteen states have this rule, but
seventeen states hold the first verdict an entirety which can only be displaced
in toto, allowing retrial on the higher charge also. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1141,
1146 (1958).
7'Any different rule than that indicated here would, as we view it, be a
serious impairment of a defendant's right to immunity from a second trial for the
same offense, when a )ury of his peers in a proper judicial proceeding has once
found him not guilty.' Commonwealth v. Dietrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 At. 275, 279
(1908).
(10,here was ample evidence of murder, but no evidence of passion." Com-
monwealth v. Frazier, 216 A.2d 337, 338 (1966). This problem does not arise in
the seventeen state jurisdictions which allow retrial of the higher charge. See
Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1958).
9 420 Pa. 209, 216 A.2d at 339.
1o Ibid.
"1Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1141, 1147, 1169 (1958); 42 C.J.S. Indictments &
Information § 299 (1964).
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inal procedure which prevents retrial of a person who has been
acquitted of a given crime.'2 It is a matter of basic procedure that the
state always bears the burden of proving the existence of every element
necessary to constitute the crime charged; "and if the proof fails to
establish any of the essential elements... the defendant is entitled to
an acquittal."13 Of course, the re-use of the original evidence to prove
the lesser crime is allowed, but the requirements of proof must still be
satisfied. The appeal here was granted from the conviction of man-
slaughter, all higher crimes being disposed of by acquittal, and the
retrial concerned only the charge of manslaughter. That the proof of
guilt was probably discharged by the commonwealth in the first trial
was not sufficient reason to depart from the requirements of proof in
the second trial. Otherwise, the defendant is deprived of the benefit
of his acquittal of murder.14 The commonwealth should not be allowed
to go to the jury and say that, although the defendant has been
acquitted of murder and cannot be punished for that offense eo
nomine, yet, if they believe from the evidence he did commit murder
they may call it manslaughter and punish him for that offense. 15 While
this does not violate principles of double jeopardy, it amounts to a re-
trial of murder. Does not this violate concepts of due process?
The court was concerned with the prospect of allowing a criminal
to go free solely because of an inconsistency in procedure,' but the
public interest is better served by requiring proof of an indictment.
There is a conflict between public safety and one individuars rights,
but the latter represents our society's concepts of fundamental justice
which must transcend the circumstances of a particular case. The court
should not depart from the principle of Dietrlck7 in treating a verdict
of the lesser crime as being a complete acquittal of the greater. But
instead, the court should restrict the rule s which allows complete
exercise of jury equity, and only allow the jury to return a verdict of
the lesser crime if there is some evidence to support it. If the pre-
sumption of innocence of murder has not been overcome, acquittal is
in order.
Alan Lips
12 See Commonwealth v. Dietrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 Atl. 275, 279 (1908).
13 Commonwealth v. Dietrick, 218 Pa. 36, 66 AUt. 1007 (1907); 20 Am Jur.
Evidence § 149 (1939).
14 Parker v. State, 22 Tex. Ct. App. R. 105, 3 S.W. 100, 103 (1886).
15 Ibid.
16 Because the jury was allowed to return manslaughter where there was no
evidence of mitigating circumstances, the state had no evidence to prove provoca-
tion in the second trial.
'7 221 Pa. 7, 70 Ad. 275 (1908).
18 Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 220 A.2d 807 (1966); Com-
monwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59, 122 At. 166 (1923); Commonwealth v.
McMurray, 198 Pa. 51, 47 At. 952 (1901).
